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THE FLORIDA EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
AN EXPERIMENT IN CIVIL WAR ADMINISTRATION
by WILLIAM C. HAVARD
The conduct of a major war, even under favorable conditions
of internal stability, often results in a state of organized confusion
in the government. For the South in the Civil War, the admini-
stration of the war effort was complicated to an unusual degree
by the necessity of simultaneously reorganizing the political un-
ion which bound the states together. And even within the indi-
vidual states themselves, the urgency of the war situation de-
manded the assumption of governmental functions which were
new to the states-functions such as external defense, control of
the manufacturing and transportation of essential goods, and the
financing of these and related war measures. Under such extra-
ordinary circumstances, it is hardly surprising that extraordinary
forms of governmental organization should appear.
It was natural, too, that the executive branch of government
should have been the object of the most widespread criticism
in those uncertain revolutionary times. The importance of the
executive is greatly increased in time of war. The successful
prosecution of a war is largely a matter of effective administra-
tion, with rapid decisions to be made on a myriad of problems
requiring immediate settlement. The laborious resolution of is-
sues by deliberation in a popular legislative assembly must give
way, through broad legislative delegations of discretionary power,
to a combination of administrative planning and execution. When
a country is united and confident of its persisting democratic
institutions, this transition is easily effected; but when the situ-
ation is aggravated by the internal dissension of civil war, it is
difficult to make such an institutional adjustment. The estab-
lishment, in 1862, of an Executive Council for the State of Florida
was symptomatic of this difficulty, both in the manner of its
creation and in the method of its functioning.
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Existing political arrangements were not calculated to help the
State adjust to the political impact of secession and war. Gover-
nor John Milton, against whose administration the Executive
Council was set up as a check, was elected in October 1860 (a
month before the election of Lincoln had put the torch to the
powder-keg of Southern radicalism), but he did not take office
until a year later. 1 Between Milton’s election and his assumption
of office late in 1861, the State seceded from the Union, entered
the Confederacy, and became engulfed in a full-scale war.
The mood of the greater part of the population, too, had
changed during this interval from one of anxious waiting to an
inflamed belligerency. Governor Madison S. Perry had assumed
a very radical position. His message to the Legislature in Novem-
ber 1860 was full of strongly worded exhortations against the
North, ending with an appeal for a secession convention; 2 and
when the convention met in the following January he had forced
its hand on the issue of withdrawal from the Union by sending
State troops to take over the Federal arsenal at Chattahoochee,
Fort Marion in St. Augustine, and Fort Clinch in Fernandina. 3
By way of contrast, Governor-elect John Milton, was definitely
in the conservative camp. He had earlier been openly opposed
to secession, and continued until the beginning of the war to urge
moderation. 4 His nomination as Democratic candidate for gov-
ernor in June 1860, was carried by the narrowest margin of votes
in the nominating convention. Milton’s home county, Jackson,
had the largest group of delegates at the convention and thus
aided greatly in securing the nomination for him. Coming from
West Florida, which was the more conservative area of the
1, William Lamar Gammon, II, Governor John Milton of Florida, Con-
federate States of America, (Unpublished Master’s Thesis, University
of Florida), p. 73.
2. The Governor’s Message to the General Assembly, House Journal,
1860, pp. 8-12.
3. Gammon, op. cit., p. 77.
4. Ibid., chaps. VI and VII.
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State, 5 and being a somewhat deliberate man, Milton was not
calculated to fill the role of an oratorical inciter to great war
deeds, which must have been expected of him in view of his
predecessor’s actions and the growing popular radicalism.
During the long interval between his election and his inaugura-
tion, Governor Milton, whose military experience and conserva-
tive predisposition made him aware of the gravity of the portend-
ing secession and war, spent some time inspecting the state’s
defenses. 6 Upon assuming office, he became very dissatisfied with
the administration of the State’s military organization. He found
that direction of the military was in the hands of the radical fol-
lowers of Perry who lacked the capacities for military organization
and leadership. In addition, the laws governing the recruitment,
organization, and transfer to the Confederacy of the militia did
not, in his opinion, provide adequately for the needs of the State.
Accordingly, he began simultaneously to reorganize the state
components over which he had authority and to try to influence
the Confederate war department in its handling of Florida
troops. 7 His appointments were drawn either from the Whigs
or from the more conservative ranks of the Democrats, and his
efforts with the armed forces were based on the fairly definite
military strategy of protecting the Apalachicola River valley
which formed the center of communications not only from the
Gulf to East and West Florida, but also from Florida into Ala-
bama and Georgia. 8
Financial troubles, of course, added to the trying problems of
military organization. The actions of the Convention and the
Legislature contradicted one another on the methods by which
5. William Watson Davis, The Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida.
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1913), p. 63.
6. Gammon, op. cit., p. 76.
7. Davis, op. cit., pp. 142-143.
8. Gammon, op. cit., p. 94.
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money was to be raised.9 Tax-collection was suspended during
1860-1861 10 and measures of the Legislature and the Convention
vesting the Governor and the Quartermaster with authority to
expend funds for military equipment were open to varying in-
terpretations. 11 Finally, the state accounts in 1861 were “so badly
muddled that it is probably impossible to estimate with accuracy
how much was really expended and for what.“ 12 The 1861 Legis-
lature constituted an additional burden on the Governor because
it contained a sizeable number of radical Democrats who dem-
onstrated little willingness to cooperate with him. 13 And the radi-
cals had an even stronger reserve force in the form of the seces-
sion Convention, which they could bring into a action to confuse
further the already obscure locus of governmental power.
The theory and activities of the secession conventions of the
various Southern states comprise some of the most interesting
aspects of Civil War history. These conventions operated, im-
plicitly if not always directly, under the sovereignty theory
framed by Calhoun. This theory was based on the idea that sov-
ereignty was illimitable, indivisible, and inalienable. Although
sovereignty was an attribute of the whole people of the state,
it was exercised through a convention especially chosen as a
device by which the people could act in a sovereign capacity.
The convention itself thus became in fact the sovereign people,
exercising unlimited powers.14 Calhoun apparently was under
the impression that this rigid doctrine was necessary to sustain
9. See: “Address by John C. McGehee, President of the Convention,”
Journal of the Convention of the People of Florida in a Called Session
Begun and held at the Capitol in the City of Tallahassee on Tuesday,
January 14, 1862. (Hereinafter referred to as Convention Journal, 1861
or 1862) p. 4. ff.
10. Gammon, op. cit., p. 87.
11. Convention Journal, 1862, pp. 6-7. 
12. Davis, op. cit., p. 91.
13. Gammon, op. cit., pp. 114-117.
14. Laura A. White, “The Fate of Calhoun’s Sovereign Convention in
South Carolina,” American Historical Review, (Vol. 34, July, 1929),
p. 762.
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the right to secede and his arguments were eagerly seized by
Southern radicals.
The Calhoun theory was quite clearly invoked in Florida, al-
though the conditions under which the Convention was called
indicate that secession and not extensive State constitutional
change was to be its main concern. The application of the idea
of a sovereign convention is amply demonstrated by two sig-
nificant pieces of internal evidence. First, in the act calling the
Convention, the Legislature included the dictum that “the or-
dinances of said Convention shall be the supreme law of the
State of Florida, anything elsewhere to the contrary notwith-
standing.“ 15 And second, the Convention, in all its pronounce-
ments, made use of the phrase “the people of the State of Florida
in Convention assembled,“ l6 rather than the pre-and post-war
phrase, “We the people of the Territory [State] of Florida, by our
Delegates in Convention, assembled . . . ,“ 17 which implies a
representative function rather than an act of transmutation. By
these two usages in combination, both the unlimited power of
the Convention and the actual translation of the Convention
into the sovereign people are substantiated.
The Florida Convention, bolstered by the Calhoun doctrine,
first met on January 3, 1861. Before it adjourned in April of the
same year, (after having recessed from March 1 until April 18),
it had passed the secession ordinance, approved a revised State
Constitution, accepted the Confederate Constitution, and passed
a number of ordinances which, although not directly concerned
with the Constitution, would appear to have had extraordinary
legal status by virtue of the sovereign nature of the Convention.
In adjourning, the Convention not only left the way open for a
future meeting, but also ensured against any other “sovereign”
15. Laws of the State of Florida, Tenth Session of the General Assembly,
1860-1861, Chapter 1094.
16. Convention Journal, 1861, passim.
17. See the Convention Journal of 1838-39 and subsequent ones.
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Convention being called during the remainder of the year. Its
adjournment resolution stated:
“Resolved, that this Convention now adjourn sine die, unless
convened by the President on or before the 25th of December
next.” Adopted April 27, 1861. 18
Nothing further was heard of the Convention until John C.
McGehee, its President, visited Tallahassee on December 10,
1861; at which time, he reports, he had not the slightest expecta-
tion that the Convention would reassemble. However, according
to McGehee, many people, including members of the Conven-
tion, urged him to act because of “circumstances of difficulty and
embarrassment in the affairs of . . . [the] Commonwealth, which
could not be relieved by any other than the sovereign power of
the State . . . “ Accordingly the President issued a call, dated
December 13, for the Convention to reassmble on Tuesday,
January 14th, 1862 in Tallahassee. 19
This call and the subsequent actions of the Convention, in-
cluding the establishment of the Executive Council, raised serious
questions as to the legitimacy of this session of the Convention.
In the first place there was a question as to whether, in schedul-
ing a meeting of the Convention for a date later than that es-
tablished by its own adjournment resolution, the Convention was
not acting illegally. And secondly, the even more important ques-
tion of the powers of the Convention itself were reopened.
The President of the Convention lightly dismissed the matter
of the late date of its meeting with a semantical argument. He
construed the word “convene” in the adjournment resolution to
mean “call” or “convoke”, so that by issuing the call before De-
cember 25, even though the actual meeting was later, there was
no abrogation of the intent of the Convention as expressed in
the resolution. 20 The issue on the larger question was not thor-
18. Convention Journal, 1861, Resolution 33.
19. Convention Journal, 1862, p. 4 ff.
20. Ibid., 4-5.pp.
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oughly debated until the Convention’s actions were complete.
The Florida Sentinel, published in Tallahassee, was one of the
leading radical newspapers and had actively pressed the case for
calling another session of the Convention. On the opening day of
the session the paper argued that the motives of the Convention
in reassembling were of the highest and, contrary to opinion in
some quarters, the Convention did not meet solely for the purpose
of criticising the Governor’s acts and policies “and to pass or-
dinances abridging his power under the Constitution as an Ex-
ecutive.” The editorial writer went on to argue, however, that the
administration of Governor Milton certainly could claim the
Convention’s attention. Even more, the paper expressed itself as
willing “to trust to their [the members of the Convention’s] wis-
dom if they abridge the power of the Governor to the narrowest
limit consistent with the Constitution and the interests of the
State.” The Sentinel also was careful to reiterate the fact that the
Convention stood on completely legal grounds in practically any-
thing it did because of the wording used in calling the Con-
vention. As a capstone to its strong stand on this matter, the
paper suggested that it would be a very good move should the
Convention decide to establish by ordinance, as the State of
South Carolina had just done, an Executive Council to assist the
Governor in the administration of the war effort. 21
The parallels between the action of the South Carolina Con-
vention and the Florida Convention are too striking to be ig-
nored. South Carolina, home of nullification, secession, and of
Calhoun the theorist of both, certainly was in a position to set
the precedents to be followed by the other seceding states in
making provision for their independent governments. And on the
points which concern us here, no Confederate state was more
zealous in following South Carolina’s lead than Florida.
The South Carolina Convention had set its first precedent for
21. Florida Sentinel, January 14, 1862.
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Florida to follow when it reconvened itself in a called session
on December 27, 1861. It set the second when it created by ordi-
nance an Executive Council, which was to become “the source
  of the greatest political controversy in the civil war history of the
state.“ 22 The South Carolina Executive Council was composed of
the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor and three other members
selected by the Convention. The Council so organized was vested
with almost unlimited war powers, including full control of the
state military organization, the power to declare martial law,
extensive powers of arrest and detention of disloyal persons, ap-
propriation (with compensation) of private property, broad
powers of appointment, and additional general powers with re-
spect to finance. The Council went far beyond a mere cabinet
system; it was a Council of Safety of which the Governor was
merely another member. The appointed members were influential
political figures and were possessed of great ability. They rapidly
seized the initiative from the elected officials and, because the
Convention had earlier abolished nearly all state cabinet posts,
they were able to create and assume the headship of departments
in the state administration. The members of the South Carolina
Executive Council, being paid a full annual salary, became ex-
tremely active not only in planning, but in administering the af-
fairs of the state as well. 23
By contrast with the South Carolina Council which it imitated,
the Florida Executive Council was somewhat pallid in function
and membership, if not in its legal basis. It was created by Or-
dinance 52 of the Convention, entitled “An ordinance for strength-
ening the Executive Department during the exigencies of the
present war.“ 24 The Council was composed of four members
elected by the Convention. Although the text of the ordinance
22. Charles Edward Cauthen, South Carolina Goes to War, 1860-1865,
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1950), p. 144.
23. Ibid. pp. 142-144.
                                              p. 31ff.
24. Constitution and Ordinances of the Convention, (as revised), 1862,
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did not include the Governor in its membership, the implication
was plain that he was to act for all purposes as a member of the
Council. From the wording of the ordinance it is clear that the
Council was to share fully in “the discharge of the duties im-
posed and in the exercise of the powers conferred upon . . . “ 25
the Governor. In other words, the Convention had decided that
extraordinary powers had of necessity to be vested in an admin-
istrative authority of the State, that the Governor was not to be
the sole and unchecked depository of these powers, and that an
instrumentality of the Convention’s own creation should be set
up which would, in effect, act as a thorough check on the Gov-
ernor by sharing directly in the exercise of these powers. The
Convention created in legal form a plural executive, and con-
ferred upon it some of the Governor’s traditional powers and
many additional war powers as well.
The powers of the Florida Council were precisely those which
the South Carolina Convention had granted to its Council. The
Governor and Council of Florida acting together had the power
to declare martial law, to arrest and detain all disloyal and dis-
affected persons whose being at large they deemed inconsistent
with the public safety, and to order and force the disposition or
appropriation of private property for public uses subject to the
owner’s right of just compensation. In addition, the Council and
the Governor could make and cause to be executed all orders,
regulations and amendments (which they found expedient in
view of eminent danger) for bringing into public service the
whole or any part of the population. They could maintain the
police; make, secure and employ arms and munitions of war
for the defense of the State; constitute agencies and appoint the
agents necessary to carry out their powers; and draw money
from the treasury on warrants from the Comptroller for effecting
these measures. The Council was given the power of appoint-
25. Ibid., p. 31.
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ment over military offices which had previously been in the
hands of the Governor, as well as certain other appointive powers.
The Council was also allowed to fill vacancies in its own mem-
bership, although Ordinance 58 amended this provision by pro-
viding that the president of the Convention could fill the va-
cancy if caused by death or failure of one of the members to
accept the position.
The Governor was authorized to consult the Council in the
discharge of all other duties and powers of his office, and if the
need arose he could require the Council’s advice in writing.
The first meeting of this new executive body was to be held,
upon call of the Governor, within twenty days of the adjourn-
ment of the called session of the Convention. If the Governor
did not issue the call, the Council was to assemble on February
28 and thereafter would set its own times of meeting. The Gover-
nor and any two of the Council were to constitute a quorum,
and a majority vote of all those present was sufficient for action.
The Council members were required to take the same oath of
Office as the Governor, and they were subject to the same dis-
abilities as the Governor for malpractice in office. Their pay
was equivalent to that of the members of the Legislature.
Some checks were established against the use of arbitrary
power by the Council. A full record of its proceedings was to be
kept by the Governor’s private secretary, who was to act as
secretary to the Council without additional compensation. The
records were especially to show the reasons for every arrest made
by the Council’s authority. These proceedings were to be pre-
sented to the Legislature on the opening day of its meetings, and
were subject to legislative review, even to the extent of modifi-
cation or repeal of the Council’s actions. Nothing in the ordi-
nance was to be construed as constituting a basis for the sus-
pension of the writ of Habeas Corpus.
Having enacted this sweeping ordinance and several others
10
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pertaining to the military and fiscal affairs of the State and hav-
ing elected the Executive Council members, the Convention
was ready to adjourn. Although it never actually met again, it
was not prepared to surrender its sovereign status by adjourn-
ing sine die. Curiously, or perhaps appropriately enough, the
ordinance creating the Council also established the conditions
under which the Convention might meet in future called ses-
sions. Such a meeting could be held on call of the President, and
it would be mandatory for him to issue such a call if petitioned
to do so by any thirty-five members. A special committee of five
members was created to issue the call in the event of the death,
resignation or disqualification of the President.
The members of the Executive Council were elected individu-
ally by the Convention: James A. Wiggins of Marion County
won on the first ballot, M. D. Papy of Leon was the second mem-
ber selected, polling a clear majority of the Convention votes
on the eighth ballot; W. D. Barnes of Jackson won on the tenth
ballot and Smith Simkins of Jefferson on the eleventh. 26 Among
these men only M. D. Papy remains as something of a lasting
name in Florida political history, having served as Attorney
General of the State from 1853 to 1860. 27 He also was one of the
five commissioners sent to Washington after the surrender of the
Confederacy to inquire as to the status of the State in the Union.
Later he participated in the framing of the “Black Code.” Sim-
kins served as the first sheriff of Jefferson County 28 and Barnes
was nominated by the Democratic Party for Congress in 1868,
but was defeated in the general election. 29 Beyond these efforts,
the Council members seem not to have been particularly in-
fluential in the long-range political affairs of Florida.
26. Convention ]ournal, 1862, pp. 100-102.
27. Rowland H. Rerick, Memoirs of Florida (Atlanta: The Southern His-
torical Association, 1902), Vol. II, pp. 91 and 94.
28. “Smith Simkins,” Biographical Souvenir of the States of Georgia and
Florida, (Chicago: F. A. Battey and Co., 1889), pp. 738-739.
29. Davis, op. cit., p. 611.
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The Governor was unalterably opposed to the establishment
of the Council, and adopted something of an attitude of passive
resistance. When Papy, Wiggins, and Simkins presented them-
selves to him on February 28, 1862, in accordance with the
directives of the ordinance establishing the Council, he regis-
tered his dissent in cogent terms. 30 His arguments against the
legitimacy of the Convention were grounded in the idea that
the Convention was created for limited purposes - in particular
to decide on the matter of secession. At no time did the people,
in his view, invest the Convention with ordinary legislative
powers. Apparently Milton believed that the cause by which
the Convention’s ordinances were made the “supreme law” had
reference only to a secession and constitutional actions by the
Convention, and not to the many matters which they addition-
ally brought into their purview by ordinances and resolutions.
He went on to say that even if the people did intend to invest
the Convention with sovereign powers and with powers of ordi-
nary legislation, these powers were yielded when the secession
Constitution was promulgated on April 27, 1861.
He further noted that he believed the Convention to hold
two erroneous opinions on which it based its claims to the
powers enunciated by it. First, there seemed to be an idea that
when the State seceded its own organic govermnent ceased. If
this were true, said Milton, Florida could not have made the
claim to be an independent sovereign state and had no right
to secede. Second, the notion had been fostered that the people
of Florida were indebted to the Convention for the Constitution.
If this were true, it would merely be an incident of the first
argument and the actions of the Convention were invalid on
the grounds just noted. Actually, according to Milton, the Con-
vention only republished the Constitution of an already sov-
30. Governor Milton’s arguments, from which the following summary is
derived, are included in “Proceedings of the Executive Council,” Senate
Journal, 1862, Appendix: “Documents Accompanying the Message of
the Governor,” pp. 53ff.
12
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ereign state, after dissociating the State from the Union.
Governor Milton also raised the question as to where the
Constitution fitted into the particular structure of laws on which
the Convention acted. In creating the Council (as well as in
other of its actions) the Convention was overriding the basic
law itself. In reality it was violating the principle of the sepa-
ration of powers by creating two legislative bodies-the Execu-
tive Council and the Convention - in addition to the General
Assembly, and only the latter could be said to be under the
control of the Constitution.
In brief, it was Milton’s opinion that “the late ‘Convention’
had no right as a political body claiming to represent the people
to have assembled, and no right after the constitution had been
adopted and promulgated, and the officers of the State, civil
and military, had been sworn to support it, to amend it.”
He next noted that he did not arrogate to himself the author-
ity to decide upon the powers of the Convention and that,
although he considered these powers a matter for the judiciary
to settle, the times called for harmony so “he would cheer-
fully cooperate with them (the Council) so far as he could do
so consistently with the Constitution and laws of the State which
as Governor he had sworn to preserve, protect and defend. . .”
He hoped that they could counsel together harmoniously and
accomplish some benefit for the State, without infringing obli-
gations of the Constitution, “while at the same time he did not
admit any power claimed by them derived from the Con-
vention. . . . “
The Governor apparently cooperated only in the discussion
phases of the meetings, and did not vote when decisions were
made. On one occasion, with two members present, the vote
was split and the Governor was called upon to cast the decid-
ing ballot. He refused, reiterating his previous stand and making
the additional point that he was forbidden by the Constitution
13
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to legislate and had no power to violate the constitution. 31
Just as the arguments on behalf of convention sovereignty
in Florida echoed those of South Carolina, so also did the Gov-
ernor’s arguments repeat, in part, the anti-sovereignty views of
the Charleston Courier. The Courier had strongly opposed the
sovereignty idea, holding that conventions were merely repre-
sentative bodies composed of extraordinary delegates assembled
on extraordinary occasions to discharge functions for which ordi-
nary government was inadequate or unsuited. Constitution
making in itself was not a sovereign function nor, for that mat-
ter was any governmental function illimitable. The Convention
exercised derivative, not original, responsibility - the people
were still sovereign. And even closer to the arguments of Milton
were the Courier’s statements that the Convention had violated
the separation of powers principle, which was the accepted
legal method of distributing those governmental powers which
were vested in the agents of the sovereign people. 32
The Florida Executive Council, then, began its life under a
condition of strained relations and it never achieved the promi-
nence of its counterpart in South Carolina. It had been created
by a convention whose vote on the question was divided 26 to
17. The regular cabinet posts were not abolished in Florida as
they had been in South Carolina, so no opportunity was given
the Council members to take over the departmental positions.
For the most part the Council acted as an advisory body to the
Governor and, more specifically, its members gave their sanc-
tion, in the form of resolutions, to a number of administrative
actions which the Governor was left to carry out.
In all, the Executive Council met five times; ordinarily the
sessions lasted for two or three days. Papy and Simkins were
more conscientious in attending the meetings than Wiggins and
31. Ibid. Council meeting of April 26, 1862.
32. White, op. cit., p. 763.
14
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Barnes, Papy being present on all five occasions, Simkins on
four, Wiggins on two, and Barnes on only one, and then not
for the whole session. The beginning dates of the five meetings
were February 28, April 3, April 11, April 26 and May 1; all,
of course, in 1862.
By far the greatest part of the Council’s activities were de-
voted to the approval of resolutions designed to allow the
Governor to prosecute the war effort more vigorously. A com-
parison of the Council’s resolutions with the Governor’s attitudes
on the war and his subsequent requests to the Legislature gives
strong indications that the Council was largely engaged in
ratifying the decisions which the Governor had arrived at in-
dependently. 3 3 With only two exceptions the council acted
unanimously on all matters.
Not many of the Executive Council’s actions can be construed
as broad policy decisions. Approval of appointments, authoriza-
tion of vouchers in small amount and similar resolutions occur
most frequently among the records of the agency’s business. In
addition, various individual measures of war administration were
sanctioned, including the right of the Governor to employ the
Coast Guard as needed until it could be turned over to the
Confederacy or until other Confederate services were substi-
tuted for it, authorization for the Governor to take up and use
elsewhere specific railroad and telegraph installations which
might otherwise fall into the hands of Union troops, authorization
for the Governor to purchase or to have made such items as
gunpowder and Pierson knives, and approval of the raising or
disposition of certain bodies of troops.
Larger and more controversial issues than these, however,
came before the Council. Perhaps the most important of all
was the resolution reorganizing the state militia, which was
33. E.g., The Governor's Message to the General Assembly, House Journal,
1862, p. 20ff.
15
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passed on April 4, 1862. One of the most unfortunate earlier
actions of the Convention in January, 1862, had been the approval
of a motion disbanding the militia as of March 10 - 34 more than
a month before the Confederate Conscript Act of April 16. The
carrying out of the Convention’s orders came at a disastrous mo-
ment. The shortage of Confederate troops had forced a with-
drawal of units from the deep South in order to protect the
northern borders of the Confederacy at the very time when
the Convention’s action on the state militia compelled Governor
Milton to abolish the only military forces with which the State
could make any defense against the pressing Federal invasion.
In the attempt to forestall the complete collapse of state defenses
and to provide a systematic method of supplying the Confed-
eracy’s requisitions of troops, the Executive Council passed its
short-lived resolution reorganizing the militia.
Under the militia plan approved by the Council all non-exempt
able-bodied males between the ages of 16 and 60 were subject
to military duty. Among those exempt were the Governor and
the members of the Executive Council, most of the state execu-
tive and judicial officials, persons exempted by the Confederacy,
railroad operating personnel, and those engaged in manufac-
turing salt. Regimental and battalion commanders were to enroll,
with the assistance of the sheriffs, tax assessors, and tax collectors,
all the men within their various Beats. Elections for officers were
to be held and the returns sent to the Adjutant General. The units
were to be required to drill as companies once a week, and as
battalions or regiments at least every two months; and weekly
reports were to be made by the company commanders to the
Adjutant General. Men between 18 and 50 years of age were
subject to detachment for active service in the Confederacy, with
the various companies bearing an equal share of the men re-
quired for such active service. The older and younger men
34. Davis, op. cit., p. 143.
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were to remain organized for home defense when those subject
to Confederate duty had been called. Fines were levied for failure
to comply with the reorganization. 35
Objections were quickly raised to this plan. The Florida Sen-
tinel, previously so eager to give full credence to the extravagant
claims of power made on behalf of the Convention, now raised
the strongest objections to the Council’s action. Actually, the
Sentinel was beginning a gradual change from its previous out-
spoken opposition to the Governor to a more moderate position
of support for the chief executive. Oddly, the arguments of the
paper were exactly those which the Governor had put to the
Council at its first meeting. “Where,” asked the Sentinel, “does
the Executive Council gets its authority to reorganize the militia?
Where does it [get] the power to legislate at all?” And a little
later the writer asserts that, “It may be contended that the
Council claim their authority from an ordinance of the Con-
vention, and that by virtue of the assumed or arrogated omnipo-
tence of that body, they, their creatures, can do what they please.
This argument is not sound; for, even if the Convention had
the right to legislate, which is extremely doubtful, they could
not delegate that right to any other than that branch of govern-
ment which they themselves, by the Constitution of their own
creation, had made the depository of all legislative power.” It
should be added that in the midst of these theoretical arguments,
the paper also made it clear that it was piqued at the fact that
the Council had included its own membership in the list of
those exempt from compulsory militia service. 36
The Council heeded the arguments of the opponents of the
militia and on April 26, after having amended the resolution
slightly at the previous meeting on April 11, repealed the militia
35. “Proceedings of the Executive Council,” op. cit., Meeting of April 4
(wrongly dated April 14 in the Journal).
36. Florida Sentinel, April 15, 1862.
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reorganization measure. 37 From that time until late in the war,
the Governor had to work within the framework of volunteer
military organizations for any uses necessitated by the war.
Several other important problems were handled by the Coun-
cil. On April 4, the Governor was authorized to take the necessary
measures to prevent efforts to ship cotton from the State without
his special leave. On the same date, he was permitted to estab-
lish martial law in East Florida. On April 28, the Council passed
a stern resolution restricting the sale of alcoholic beverages, and
on the following day they passed an even stronger resolution
requiring the discontinuation, under pain of suppression, of
distilleries. Finally, on April 29, the Council authorized the
raising of a volunteer company, including a squad of cavalry,
“to operate as a police force on or near the coast between the
Apalachicola river and St. Andrews’ Bay.”
During its lifetime, the Council passed a total of about thirty
resolutions or ratifications of gubernatorial orders and approved
several appointments, including that of the Adjutant General.
When it adjourned on Thursday May 1, at the end of its fifth
session, the Council scheduled a meeting for the first Monday
in July, unless the Governor should call it into session sooner.
On May 15, the Governor received a message from M. D. Papy,
directed to him and to the Council, in which Papy tendered his
resignation without stating the grounds for his action. When the
first Monday in July came, none of the Council attended the
meeting and neither the Governor nor the Council called a sub-
sequent one.
The legal demise of the Council did not occur, however, until
the legislative session of November, 1862. At that session, the
Governor’s message contained a repetition of his arguments
against the Council. Accompanying the message was a copy of all
37. “Proceedings of the Executive Council,” op. cit., meeting of April 26,
 1862.            
18
Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 33 [1954], No. 2, Art. 3
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol33/iss2/3
THE FLORIDA EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, 1862 95
the ordinances and resolutions passed by the Convention. Particu-
lar attention was called to Ordinance 63 which declared thirty
Convention ordinances and three resolutions to be “of a perma-
nent character and not repealable by ordinary legislation.” The
other ordinances were declared to be temporary and repealable
when circumstances required such action. Included among the lat-
ter was Ordinance 52, the ordinance creating the Florida Execu-
tive Council. 38 Acting on the Governor’s strongly argued case
against the Council, the Legislature repealed Ordinance 52. 39
Florida’s experiment with a plural war executive was at an end.
The experiment had never been a real success. The members
of the Council did not take the bit in their teeth and run away
with the Florida executive as the South Carolina Council had
done, probably because the Florida Convention had done less
to disrupt the existing machinery of government than had the
South Carolina Convention. At the same time the Council man-
aged, through such actions as their resolution on the militia,
to incur the antipathy of the supporters of the Council idea.
Although the Governor did not wage a continuing fight against
the Council, he was outspoken in his opposition to its creation
and repeated his views on its inadvisability frequently. It was,
after all, something of a slap in the face of his administration.
Besides this, his conceptions of the legal structure of the State
did not admit of its legitimacy, and he naturally preferred to
choose his own advisors to assist in administering the affairs of
the State. Once the highly emotional state of the population in
the early days of secession and war had passed away and cooler
appraisal of events was possible, it became obvious that Milton
was a competant administrator and that his planning and execu-
tion of the affairs of the State were adequate, especially in the
38. The Governor’s Message to the General Assembly, House Journal, 1862,
p. 42. Also “Documents Accompanying the Message of the Governor,”
39.
p. 71.
Acts and Resolutions, Twelfth General Assembly of the State of Florida,
1862, Chapter 1357.
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light of the adverse conditions under which he worked. The
radicalism of the Convention, too, had worked a hardship on
the State in fiscal and military matters; the public and the
Legislature had not forgotten the difficulties of validating cur-
rency and bond issues and the debacle attendent upon the
dissolution of the militia. In short, the time had come to give
up extraordinary remedies applied under conditions of unprece-
dented change and to revert to traditional constitutional prac-
tices.
It is interesting to note that the South Carolina Executive
Council was dissolved in practically the same manner as its
Florida counterpart. But by contrast, its dissolution was due
largely to the popular enmity aroused by the aggressive use of
its powers, 40 whereas the Florida Council passed from the scene
without having made a great impact either on the structure or
the policies of Florida government. However, the tradition of a
collegial executive did not die in 1862; even today Florida’s
cabinet system represents an extreme example of the sharing of
executive power between the governor and a body of adminis-
trative officials independent of the governor.
40. Cauthen, op. cit., pp. 159-161.            
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